State v. Knott Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 40074 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-24-2013
State v. Knott Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40074
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Knott Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40074" (2013). Not Reported. 969.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/969
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. No. 40074-2012 
DA YID M. KNOTT, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court 
of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Blaine 
Honorable R. Ted Israel, Magistrate Judge 
Honorable Robert J. Elgee, District Judge 
ANDREW PARNES 
Law Office of Andrew Parnes 
671 First A venue North 
Post Office Box 5988 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
208-726-1010 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
DAPHNE J. HUANG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
Post Office Box 83 720 
Boise, Idaho 
208-334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF - RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 1 
THE REFUSAL WAS NOT RELEVANT, ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
BECAUSE THE OFFICER PROVIDED INCORRECT ADVICE 
CONCERNING THE REFUSAL ............................................... 1 
MAGISTRATE'S RELIANCE ON CASES INVOLVING ADMISSION OF 
ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS IS ERRONEOUS .................................. 3 
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 5 
v. McNeely, 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
U.S._, 2013 Lexis 3160 ...................................................... 4 
STATE CASES 
Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983) ................................................................. 2 
Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983) ..................................................................... 2 
State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 206,328 P.2d 1065 (1958) ........................................................... l 
State v. Kling,, 150 Idaho 188,245 P.3d 449 (Ct. App. 2010) ......................................... 2 
State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989) ................................................... 4 
Svedlund v. Municipality of Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378 (Alask. App. 1983) ...................... 2 
11 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Reply Brief is intended to respond to the arguments raised by the State's brief 
and will not repeat each argument made in Mr. Knott's Opening Brief. No waiver of such 
arguments is intended by the failure to repeat such arguments here. 
The parties do not dispute the standard of review to be applied by this Court to the 
issues raised in the briefs. See, Appellant's Opening Brief, hereinafter "AOB, pp. 3-4 and 
Respondent's Brief, hereinafter "RB,' pp. 4-5. 
II. THE REFUSAL WAS NOT RELEVANT, ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
BECAUSE THE OFFICER PROVIDED INCORRECT ADVICE 
CONCERNING THE REFUSAL 
The State baldly concludes that "[b ]y refusing a test that would either support or 
preclude his prosecution for DUI, Knott demonstrated consciousness of guilt, rendering 
his refusal relevant." (RB, p. 5.) This statement begs the issue before this Court 
whether the officer's incorrect and misleading advice undermines the reliability of the 
subsequent refusal such that evidence of the refusal should be excluded in the State's 
case-in-chief. 
Respondent relies on State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 206, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958), but in 
that case the officer did not provide any improper advice. Moreover, Appellant conceded 
that in certain instances a refusal may be admitted at trial and is not seeking an absolute 
bar on the admission of the refusal in all driving under the influence cases. (AOB, p. 4.) 
The critical question before this Court is, where the officer provided incorrect 
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advice, whether the State provided a sufficient foundation to support the relevance of a 
refusal which is admitted solely to prove a defendant's consciousness of guilt. In this 
instance, the Magistrate erred in concluding that the officer's misleading warnings about 
the consequences of refusing did not undermine the relevance of the refusal at trial. 
Without a proper foundation, the refusal loses its relevance as consciousness of 
guilt. This analysis has been applied by the appellate courts in the State of Alaska. 
In Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), the court said: 
Although an arrestee may be without the advice of counsel, he 
is entitled to a warning by the police. The police are not 
required to inform the arrestee that he has the right to refuse; 
however, if he does refitse, he must be advised of the 
consequences flowing from his refusal and be permitted to 
reconsider his refusal in light of that information. 
Id. at 1212 n.15 ( emphasis added; citation omitted). In Copelin the court 
was considering the refusal to take a breathalyzer examination in the 
context of a prosecution for driving while intoxicated or driving with a 
. I 0% blood-alcohol level. In such cases the prosecution offers the refusal as 
circumstantial evidence to show consciousness of guilt. Thus the supreme 
court was establishing a foundation for admitting refusal evidence. The 
court had previously indicated a distrust of consciousness of guilt evidence 
based on silence in the face of accusations and refusals to provide evidence. 
See Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Alaska 1983). The court, however, 
did not address refusal to supply physical characteristic evidence. See id. at 
1199. By requiring that the arrestee be infonned of the consequences of his 
refusal the court meant to ensure that the refusal would in fact support an 
inference of guilt. 
Svedlund v. Municipality of Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378 (Alask. App. 1983). 
In the instant case, the local police in Blaine County should have been aware of the 
problem with the advisory for out-of-state drivers. As the court noted in State v. Kling, 
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Idaho 188, 189,245 P.3d 449 (Ct. App. 2010), the local magistrate had ruled 
"[ c ]onsistent with his prior rulings on the same issues dating back a number of years ... ; 
there can thus be no excuse for the officer to provide incorrect information about the 
consequences of a refusal, and the State in its case-in-chief should not benefit from that 
erroneous information. 1 
Furthermore, as discussed in the opening briet: the Magistrate erred in his analysis 
of the matter under I.R.E. 403, because he made a legal ruling applicable to all cases that 
the dismissal of a refusal in the civil context did not impact a criminal trial. See, RB, pp. 
70. As a result, the Magistrate failed to consider any other basis to exclude the 
evidence as more prejudicial than probative. (See, AOB, pp. 10-12.) Respondent fails to 
address these factors and reversal or remand for consideration of these factors is required. 
THE MAGISTRATE'S RELIANCE ON CASES INVOL YING ADMISSION OF 
ALCOHOL TEST RES UL TS IS ERRONEOUS 
The State, as did the Magistrate below, argues that because the results of an 
alcohol test are always admissible, even in the face of incorrect warnings, a refusal must 
also be admitted without concern for the proper warnings. See, RB, p. 9-11. In support 
of this position, the State and the Magistrate rejected the out-of-state authority discussed 
1This particular incorrect advice is unlikely to reoccur as the Idaho Transportation 
Department has revised its advisory forms to correct the precise error at issue in this case. 
Granting relief in this case will not open a floodgate of challenges to the admission of 
refusal evidence in driving under the influence cases. But Mr. Knott should not be 
prejudiced by the improper admission of the evidence in his case. 
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Appellant's Opening Brief because those states permitted a driver to withdraw consent. 
The State and the Magistrate relied on this distinction to conclude that refusal evidence is 
ahvays admissible at trial regardless of the circumstances leading to a driver's refusal. 
However, in Missouri v. McNeely,_ U.S._, 2013 Lexis 3160, the United States 
Supreme Court held that, as a constitutional matter, implied consent does not itself 
permit all alcohol testing. In addition to the reasons set forth in Appellant's Opening 
Brief~ this Court must consider the import of McNeely. 
In McNeely, the Supreme Court abrogated the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 
State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989) that the police may take a blood 
test without a warrant, based solely on a driver's implied consent. lvfcNeely recognizes 
that a person who is arrested and requested to take an alcohol test may withdraw his 
previous "implied consent," a position the Idaho Courts have rejected. Since under 
l'JcNeely implied consent is not unlimited, the import of the refusal advisory provided to a 
person arrested for driving under the influence becomes all the more important in 
determining whether a court should admit the evidence of a defendant's refusal in the 
face of an officer's erroneous warning of the consequences of a refusal. 
If a person has the right to refuse by withdrawing "implied consent," subject to 
specific consequences of that refusal, the Magistrate's attempt to distinguish cases from 
other states which explicitly grant a right of refusal must be rejected. (See, AOB, pp. 8-
10.) This Court should accept the legal reasoning from those other jurisdictions and 
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reverse the Magistrate's decision in this case. 
Appellant is not seeking a rule of absolute exclusion of a driver's refusal in all 
cases; he is only seeking to apply proper foundation rules for the admission of such 
evidence. When an officer does not provide correct information about the consequences 
a refusal, the refusal should be excluded from the State's case-in-chief, because the 
refusal lacks relevance or is more prejudicial than probative. In this case, the mis-advice 
created a greater likelihood that, Mr. Knott, an out of state driver, would refuse the test 
without understanding that the refusal would be used against him at trial. Mr. Knott 
specifically and repeatedly asked the officer about these consequences but was provided 
incorrect advice. As a result, the evidence of his refusal should have been excluded from 
the State's case-in-chief. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those contained in Appellant's Opening Brief, this 
Court should reverse the decision of the Magistrate or in the alternative remand for proper 
consideration all the factors contained in I.R.E. 403. 
Dated of April, 2013 
Attorney for Appellant 
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